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This paper takes a systematic look at the economic impact of the crisis that 
started  in  earnest  in  the  fall  of  2008  across  countries  and  regions.  Despite 
warnings of growing domestic and external imbalances in many countries years 
ahead of the crisis, the massive impact of the crisis came as a surprise to most. 
By correlating economic performance in the crisis with an extensive set of early 
warning,  country  insurance,  and  policy  indicators,  this  paper  provides  some 
lessons on crisis prevention and management for the future. Although significant 
efforts have been made to develop robust early warnings systems, the paper 
shows the mixed success of some commonly analyzed indicators in predicting 
economic outcomes in this crisis. The only robust early warning indicator was 
increases in real estate prices while international reserves seem to have insured 
against the worst crisis outcomes on average. However, much work on building a 
robust early warning system remains and the analytical and empirical challenges 
in this area are substantial. The issues confronting early warning systems are also 
relevant to the more recent field of macro prudential supervision and regulation. 
Nevertheless,  the  cost  of  crises  is  massive  and  preventing  future  ones  with 
better regulation, policies and supervision based on solid research must be a top 
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This paper discusses prevention and crisis management strategies that have developed over 
several decades before the crisis of 2008-09. It then provides a detailed empirical examination 
of  how  key  economic  indicators  identified  after  previous  crises  correlate  with  economic 
performance in the 2008-09 crisis. This examination is closely related to long-running efforts to 
develop  early  warning  indicators  of  crises  and  more  recent  discussion  of  macro-prudential 
indicators as ways to prevent crises.
1 As will be evident in the chapter, the cost of crises is in 
many cases very substantial and ways to prevent or limit the impact of crises should be a top 
priority among economists and policy makers. However, the chapter illustrates the weaknesses 
of many of the current early warning indicators, which suggests that more research efforts in 
this area are called for. The empirical part also details the geographic impact of the crisis and 
offers some perspective on its global scope. 
 
Economic crises are not new phenomena. Policy makers have pondered how to prevent and 
deal  with  them  for  centuries.  The  definition  of  “crisis”  has  differed  over  time  and  across 
countries, and has been used to describe a wide range of diverse phenomena including for 
example  debt,  banking,  currency,  oil,  and  food  related  events.  The  crisis  label  is  also  used 
extensively to describe economic problems at the regional and country level, e.g., the Latin 
American, Asian, Russian, ERM (European Exchange Rate Mechanism) or Nordic crisis. 
 
Becker and Mauro (2006) focus on economic crises defined as episodes with substantial losses 
of GDP and document the frequency of these events over the last century for the countries 
included in the Maddison (2003) dataset. GDP was selected as the key crisis indicator because it 
is closely related to consumption and welfare. The authors show that output crises occurred 
throughout  the  20
th  century,  but  the  number  of  countries  entering  a  crisis  has  varied 
substantially over time. The peak was the great depression, when 45 percent of the countries in 
the sample experienced the onset of a crisis. In the  post-war  period, the frequency varies 
between 2-10 percent, and at the end of the century, only 2-5 percent of countries entered into 
crisis. 
 
If  countries  want  to  prevent  output  losses,  a  first  step  is  to  investigate  their  triggers  or 
correlates. Becker and Mauro accomplish this by relating the onset of a GDP crisis to a large 
number of shocks, such as debt, banking, currency and oil crises. The list of shocks also includes 
sudden stops in capital flows, drastic changes in terms of trade, sharp international interest rate 
movements, political crises, conflicts and disasters. The authors then use shock frequency data, 
together with information on output losses and conditional probabilities that link output losses 
to shocks to compute the expected value of losses for different types of countries. It turns out 
that sudden stops in capital flows are particularly harmful to emerging markets, while terms-of-
trade shocks are correlated with extreme income losses in developing countries. Other shocks, 
                                                        
1 Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) present a first early warning model of currency crises, later enhanced by 
Berg and Pattillio (1999), while for example Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) focus on banking crises and Manasse 
and Roubini (2005) on debt crises.  
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such as political, currency and debt crises also carry substantial costs.  
 
In the current crisis (the 2008-2009 crisis and its lingering aftermath), a variety of shocks hit 
many countries at the same time. Around half the 183 countries in the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook database experienced a decline in GDP. It is premature to make a final account of how 
many countries will experience output collapses as defined in Becker and Mauro (2006) because 
most have not yet returned to pre-crisis GDP levels, but the figure surely will be the highest 
since the great depression. It is also clear that banking problems, overvalued currencies, sudden 
stops in capital flows and massive swings in terms-of-trade all occurring simultaneously have 
contributed to this crisis’s global scale, in line  with the correlates identified by Becker and 
Mauro. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized in four sections. First, we look at regional economic 
performance, followed by an extensive section on crisis prevention detailing how early warning 
indicators and prevention measures correlate with economic performance. A section on crisis 
management discussing domestic and international responses to the crisis is provided next, 
before drawing lessons in the conclusion.  
 
2. Economic performance in the crisis 
 
The 2008-2009 crisis was global, but its impact was uneven across countries and regions. This 
section documents the phenomenon. It reveals that the 2008-2009 was atypically concentrated 




Compared to 2004-2007, growth rates during the current crisis receded in all country groups. 
However, it was only in advanced countries and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe that 
growth rates turned negative on average in 2008-2009. Furthermore, in developing Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, crisis growth 
rates  were  comparable  to  growth  in  2000-2003,  and  it  is  pre-crisis  growth  rates  that  look 
abnormally high. This is also true for the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries except 
Russia, which suffered a significant drop in growth rates in the crisis, well below pre-crisis rates 
(Figure 1).  
 
 
                                                        
2 There are now a number of studies that have looked at the economic impact of the crisis and its correlates, see 
for example Berkmen, Gelos, Rennhack, and Walsh (2009), Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2010), Frankel and Saravelos 
(2010), Barrell, Davis, Karim, Liadze (2010). All these papers differ from the current analysis in either how the crisis 
impact is measured, the variables that are correlated with the crisis, the geographical coverage or regional 
breakdown and/or sample period. For a more extensive discussion focused on Central and Eastern Europe, see 
Becker et al (2010).  
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Figure 1. GDP growth pre- and post-crisis around the world 
 
 
Note: IMF data and World Economic Outlook October 2010 forecast. Country labels are: Adv: Advanced economies; 
EM: Emerging markets; CEE: Central and Eastern Europe (including the Baltic countries); CIS: Commonwealth of 
Independent States; DA: Developing countries in Asia; LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean; MENA: Middle 
East and North Africa; SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa; BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
 
The projected rebound in growth rates follows a similar pattern across country groups, with 
advanced  countries  and  the  CEE  (Central  and  East  European)  region  showing  the  slowest 
recovery, suggesting that the global crisis may be less global than commonly portrayed. It is 
really  a  crisis  among  advanced  countries  and  the  CEE  region,  and  to  some  extent  the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Other parts of the world have not experienced the 
same dramatic growth slowdown or output losses. This is not only true for developing Asian, 
including India and China, but also for other emerging market countries outside the CEE and CIS 
regions.  
 
Given the regional impact of the crisis to date, the following presentation will focus on two 
particularly  hard  hit  groups:  advanced  countries  and  the  CEE  region.  Their  experience  is 
contrasted  separately  with  developing  Asia,  and  a  basket  of  other  regions  including  Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean,  Middle  East  and  North  Africa,  Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  the  CIS 


































Figure 2. Share of world GDP for different country groups 
 
Note: Based on IMF data on GDP in nominal USD and IMF forecasts. Country labels are: Adv: Advanced countries, 
CEE: Central and Eastern Europe including the Baltic countries, DA: Developing countries in Asia, Other EM: Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (including ex-CIS country Georgia). 
 
 
The crisis was a very significant negative event for world output and growth because many of 
the world’s wealthiest nations were particularly hard hit. It also had a pronounced impact on 
regional composition of global GDP due to developing Asia’s relatively strong performance.   
 
The share of world GDP contributed by advanced countries fell three percentage points from 
2007 to 2009, and is projected to fall almost as much thereafter to end-2012.
3 Developing Asia 
increased its share of world GDP by the same amount, and is expected to make similar gains 
2010-2012, reducing global income disparities.  
 
 
2.1. Income levels rather than growth rates matter 
 
When  it  comes  to  assessing  economic  performance  researchers  often  use  growth  rates 
exclusively. However, in crisis times there is reason to consider income levels rather than growth 
rates, since this is more closely linked to welfare. The distinction between growth rates and 
income levels is more important in crisis times because growth rates during these intervals are 
                                                        
3 The calculation is based on the 153 countries included in the empirical section, see appendix for the full list of 
countries included. This does not correspond to the shares presented in the IMF’s World economic outlook that 
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often negative, sizeable and unusually volatile. When average growth performance is used to 
compare countries in a crisis, significant differences in income levels (and thus welfare) can get 
lost. For example, compare two countries A and B that both start with an income level of 100 in 
2007.  Country A then experiences a negative growth rate of 10 percent in 2008 and in 2009 
“recovers” by growing by 10 percent. In contrast, country B has zero growth in both years. Both 
countries will have a zero average growth rate, but after the second year, country A’s income 
level will  only  be 99 and the country will have lost a  cumulative 11  percent of its  income 
compared to 2007, while country B obviously lost nothing. For these reasons, a measure of 
cumulative  output  gained  or  lost  during  2008  and  2009  compared  with  2007  will  be  used 
extensively as a measure of economic performance in the crisis. This measure can be computed 
for all the 153 countries included in the empirical analysis based on actual data.  
 
However, the output gained or lost in 2008 and 2009 does not provide a full account of the cost 
of crises since it does not take into account that it can take countries many years to recover 
from a crisis. A measure that takes this into account is the cumulative GDP loss used in Becker 
and Mauro (2006). This measure defines a crisis as a period when GDP is below the level it was 
prior to the crisis. The cumulative output loss is then the sum of output lost in each year 
compared to the pre-crisis GDP level until GDP has recovered back to its pre-crisis level. This is 
illustrated  in  Figure  3  where  a  crisis  starts  at  the  end  of  2007  and  last  until  2012.  In  this 
example, the cumulative output loss is 18 percent of pre-crisis GDP and the time to recover 
back to its pre-crisis GDP level is five years. This can be compared with cumulative output in 
2008 and 2009 of 11 percent of pre-crisis GDP, or average growth in 2008 and 2009 (which is a 
measure used extensively in other papers) of minus 3.7 percent. 
  
 
Figure 3. Definition of cumulative output loss and years to recover 
 
 




















The Becker and Mauro (2006) methodology is applied to all of the countries that had a negative 
growth rate in at least one of the years 2008 and 2009, which then defines the start of the crisis 
for that country. The return to the pre-crisis GDP level is estimated by using the IMF World 
Economic Outlook forecasts for the period 2010 to 2012.
4 Since some countries will not have 
returned to their pre-crisis GDP level in 2012 (the last year of this IMF forecast) the growth rate 
thereafter is assumed to be the projected 2012 growth rate. This measure is generated for all of 
the 77 countries that experienced an output loss in the crisis, or roughly half of the countries 
included in the overall sample.
5 
 
The average growth rate in 2008 and 2009 and the cumulative output gain or loss in 2008 and 
2009 can be computed for all countries based on actual data. These two measures are of course 
correlated with each other as well as with the cumulative output loss measure computed using 
the Becker and Mauro (2006) methodology but the correlations are far from perfect. Looking at 
the 77 countries for which we can compute all three measures, it is notable that only 36 of 
these  countries  also  show  a  negative  cumulative  change  over  2008-09  (since  some  were 
growing relatively well in 2008), while 45 countries show a negative average growth rate over 
the  two  years.  The  correlation  between  the  cumulative  output  loss  measure  and  the  two 
others—average growth 2008-2009 and cumulative output 2008-2009—are 82 and 69 percent, 
respectively. In short, if income levels rather than growth rates matter, using growth rates to 
compare crisis performance can be misleading. Further more, since the duration of a crisis can 
differ between countries, just looking at the immediate impact and not the full path to recovery 















                                                        
4 The IMF forecast of course changes over time and the forecast used here is the October 2010 World Economic 
Outlook that was available when the main drafting of this chapter was done. The outlook has obviously changed 
for individual countries since then but the main messages of this chapter do not change because of this.  
5 Becker and Mauro seeks to identify major output collapses and use two filters that remove output drops that last 
for less than two years and are smaller than five percent of pre-crisis GDP. In this chapter, the focus is more 
generally on economic performance and the output loss measure is competed for all countries that had negative 
growth in at least one of the years 2008 and 2009, and the additional conditions that declines have to be at least 5 
percent or last for at least two years have not been imposed here.  
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Figure 4. Regional comparison of crisis impact on GDP 
 
 
Note: Author’s calculation based on IMF data and forecasts. Years to recover: The number of years it will take for 
countries that experienced an output loss in the crisis to return to its pre-crisis GDP level shown as average for the 
countries in a country group. Cumulative loss: How much GDP a country has cumulatively lost compared to its pre-
crisis GDP level during the years before it returned to its pre-crisis GDP level computed as in Becker and Mauro 
(2006), but using IMF growth forecasts to predict GDP path. Adv: Advanced economies, EM: Emerging markets, 
CEE: Central and Eastern Europe (including the Baltic countries), CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States, 
Dev.Asia: Developing countries in Asia, LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean, MENA: Middle East and North 
Africa, SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
Figure 4 shows three variables for each country group: first, the diamonds indicate the share of 
countries in a country group that lost GDP in the crisis (measured on the right hand scale); 
second, the darker bars indicate the average cumulative loss of output during the crisis episode 
(computed for the countries in a country group that actually lost output in the crisis and using 
the method described above in Figure 3, measured on the left hand scale); finally, the lighter 
bars indicate the average number of years it is expected to take for countries to return to their 
pre-crisis GDP level (as defined in Figure 3, measured on the left hand scale). 
 
The  diamonds  in  Figure  4  display  significant  differences  between  advanced  countries  and 
emerging markets as well as between different emerging market regions when it comes to the 
share of countries that lost GDP during the crisis. A staggering 90 percent of advanced countries 
lost income during the crisis compared to pre-crisis income levels, whereas “only” 40 percent of 
emerging  market  countries  suffered  income  losses.  Differences  among  emerging  market 
countries in various parts of the world are also notable, with 85 percent of countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) suffering losses, while less than 1 in 10 countries in the MENA (Middle 
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In  terms  of  cumulative  output  lost  and  years  to  recover  to  pre-crisis  GDP,  advanced  and 
emerging market countries are more alike, with average cumulative GDP losses of around 8 
percent of pre-crisis GDP (darker bars) and 4 years to return pre-crisis GDP levels (lighter bars). 
The regional picture is more diverse, with CEE and CIS losing on average close to 15 percent 
while average losses in Asia are estimated at only 3 percent of pre-crisis GDP (darker bars). 
 
There is also considerable variation within the different country groups that is not evident by 
looking at Figure 4. For example, in the advanced country group, Ireland is projected to lose 20 
of output before it is back at its 2007 level and this is expected to take 8 years based on the low 
growth rates in the IMF forecasts, or twice the average for advanced countries. Within the CEE 
group, Latvia is projected to return to pre-crisis income levels only after 11 years after having 
lost a cumulative 42 percent of pre-crisis GDP or about three times the country group average. 
Furthermore, the massive initial drops in GDP in Latvia means that the cumulative output loss is 
substantially  larger  than  the  one  projected  for  Ireland  while  the  time  it  will  take  for  the 
countries to return to pre-crisis GDP levels is of a more similar order of magnitude. These IMF 
forecasts from late 2010 are obviously already outdated when looking at individual countries, 
but  the  numbers  on  output  losses  and  crisis  duration  illustrate  the  general  point  that  the 
economic impact of crises can be massive and long-lived and just comparing initial changes in 
growth rates between countries can be misleading. 
 
3. Crisis prevention strategies 
 
This section provides an overview of the lessons learned from previous crises, and the early 
warning  indicators  and  strategies  devised  in  various  countries  before  2008  to  prevent 
recurrences.
6 It then empirically assesses the effectiveness of these preventive measures by 
country and region.  
 
3.1. Lessons from the past 
 
Crises aren’t news. They occurred often  in the  past three decades, including  Latin America 
(1980s), Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Argentina (2000), ERM (1992) and Nordic countries (early 
1990s), and all diversely influenced crisis prevention and management thinking prior to 2008. 
Capital flight linked with debt, banking and currency problems played a major role in emerging 
market crises. In the ERM and Nordic crisis, overvalued currencies and competitiveness were 
proximate causes, stemming more fundamentally from excess credit growth, real estate bubbles 
and an impaired banking sector. 
 
The overarching lesson taught by these crises was that a stable macroeconomic environment 
                                                        
6 Becker, Jeanne, Mauro, Ostry and Ranciere (2007) discuss how shocks affect countries at different stages of 
development and policies to protect against such shocks.  
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and a sound prevention regime were essential for forestalling domestic bubbles and effectively 
coping with external shocks. The key to achieving both objectives boiled down to identifying key 
variables capable of providing timely signals of impending crisis and acquiring the pertinent 
data on a standardized basis for the entire world economy. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and other international bodies, rising to the challenge, mounted a major effort to devise a 





The IMF’s work on early warning systems started in earnest after the Mexican crisis in 1994 and 
was expanded in the aftermath of the Asian crisis in 1997, culminating in a comprehensive early 
warning model. Its Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) (IMF, April 2008) contains a table 
presenting  four  vulnerability  variables  for  27  emerging  market  countries.  They  are:  current 
account balances, private sector credit growth, changes in the ratio of private credit to GDP, and 
the external position of BIS reporting banks. Commodity price sensitivity, gross reserves to short 
term external debt, inflation and the real policy rate variables were added in October 2008,
8  
and the country set expanded to 38.
9 Further modifications were made in April 2009, during the 
2008-09 crisis.  External debt refinancing needs, loan to deposit ratios and the share of foreign 
currency deposits were added to the mix. Although specific indicators varied from set to set, all 
functioned as  proxies for (excess) borrowing, especially  in  foreign  currency  or from  foreign 
sources, and domestic macroeconomic imbalances.   
 
The  variables  chosen  by  the  IMF  contain  both  flows  and  stocks.  For  example,  the  current 
account balance is a flow variable related to the stock variables foreign debt and international 
reserves. It is unclear if early warning variables should focus on stocks or flows. For example, a 
sudden capital flow stoppage that causes a sharp current account deficit contraction can be 
harmful at relatively modest foreign debt levels, but the likelihood of the stoppage itself may 
depend on the magnitude of foreign debt relative to foreign reserves. 
 
The  2008  crisis  also  revealed  another  deficiency  in  the  IMF’s  early  warning  regime.  The 
indicators didn’t adequately capture the complexity of the international financial system. They 
took  no  account  of  the  sophisticated  instruments  employed  by  contemporary  banking 
institutions, or cross border financial linkages. These omissions were to some extent remedied 
                                                        
7 The early warning model developed by Kaminsky, Reinhart and Lizondo (1998) and further developed by Berg and 
Pattillio (1999) has led to a long line of early warning papers. Abiad (2003) provides an extensive survey and 
extension. Frankel and Saravelos (2010) extends the survey and also look at performance in the current crisis. Berg, 
Borensztein, and Pattillo (2005) look at how early warnings have worked in practice compared to various 
benchmarks, including some basic market indicators. Gosh, Ostry and Tamarisa (2009) provide a short, policy 
focused discussion of early warning systems. 
8 The real policy rate in the table is defined as the interest rate set by the monetary authority deflated by the past 
year-on-year inflation rate, so it is not based on ex-ante expected inflation. 




in the 2010 GFSR (IMF, 2010b) which presented a fresh table better attuned to the needs of 
advanced  countries  that  contain  new  variables  including  market  spreads,  fiscal  indicators, 
external debt and the potential impact of the banking system on national fiscal accounts.
10 
 
The FSB and BIS recently began collaborating with the IMF in perfecting its crisis prevention 
regime (IMF, 2010c) and related work on macro-prudential frameworks complements this effort 
(see for example IMF 2011a and 2011b). 
 
3.2.  How  did  early  warnings  and  crisis  prevention  measures  correlate  with 
economic performance in the crisis? 
 
The 2008 crisis promoted renewed calls for the creation of an effective crisis prevention regime. 
In this section, we will survey the effectiveness of prior crisis prevention regimes in terms of 
numerous  variables  grouped  into  three  main  categories:  early  warnings,  policy  choice 
instruments, and insurance measures. Table 1 lists these variables and reports their average 
values for the full sample of countries, clustered into four aggregates: advanced economies, 
CEE, developing Asia and the rest of the world (which includes LAC, MENA, SSA, and CIS).  
 
From the  regional account of GDP performance  presented earlier, we know that advanced 
countries  and  the  CEE  group  were  hardest  hit  by  the  crisis,  and  that  developing  Asia  did 
relatively  well.  Did  any  or  some  of  the  variables  listed  in  Table  1  reliably  predict  these 
outcomes? The answer is clearly yes. For example, CEE current account deficits were five times 
greater than those  in developing Asia and other emerging markets before 2008. CEE credit 
growth was extreme. CEE housing prices rose faster than anywhere else; and CEE external debt 
to GDP ratios were twice  the advanced country norm, and far greater than those of other 




Are any or some of the variables listed in Table 1 equally effective at the national level? Again, 
the answer is yes, but there aren’t sufficient numbers of independent observations to reliably 
settle the matter with regressions.
12 Simple scatter plots and correlations therefore must be 
employed instead to assess predictive power, even if causal connections are opaque.
13 Two 
measures of output will be used for this purpose. The first is the cumulative output gain or loss 
                                                        
10 The IMF provided real figures and identified areas of potential vulnerabilities as shaded boxes in its April 2008 
table. This changed in October 2008 when statistics were replaced by a color coded “heat map”. 
11 The deficit indicator however gave a faulty reading for advanced countries, where fiscal deficit on average were 
more or less balanced. 
12 In addition, the overlap of countries for some of these variables is imperfect which means that a regression with 
all the variables leaves a small number of observations to estimate quite a few coefficients. 
13 Our indicators are subject to the usual ambiguities of endogeneity and causation. Pre-crisis macro, policy and 
insurance variables are used to minimize the endogeneity problem, but it doesn’t eliminate it. Given the nature of 




2008-2009 available for 153 countries. The measure is applicable for all countries regardless of 
whether crisis period output contracts or expands. Sampling selection isn’t an issue, but the 
cumulative GDP change metric for the years 2008-09 doesn’t capture the full loss for countries 
that remained depressed beyond 2009. Therefore the cumulative output discussed above is 
computed for the 77 countries suffering protracted declines. As might be expected, predictive 
merit is sensitive to the output metric chosen, raising a variety of knotty practical issues.  
 
 
Table 1. Averages of pre-crisis variables for country groups 
 
 
Note: Variables are: average current account balance 2004-2007 as percent of GDP, average credit growth 2004-
2007, change in share prices 2004-2007, change in real house prices 2000-2006, external debt in 2007 as percent of 
GDP, average inflation rate 2004-2007, average real GDP growth rate 2004-2007, average change in real exchange 
rate 2004-2007, average fiscal balance for general government 2004-2007, average real interest rate 2004-2007, 
international reserves 2007 as percent of GDP, export concentration in 2007, total bond market capitalization in 
2007 as percent of GDP, equity market capitalization in 2007 as percent of GDP, share of foreign banks in total 
assets 2007.  
 
 
3.2.1. Early warning indicators—macro outcomes 
 
Our investigation of the predictive power of the indicators listed in Table 1 starts with macro 
outcomes that have been used as early warning indicators and then continues sequentially to 
policy  choices,  and  insurance  measures.  Averages  of  pre-crisis  values  for  all  indicators  and 
country groups are reported in the table. In Figures 5, 7 and 8 below, the same set of variables 
are plotted against the two output measures defined above; first, the cumulative output change 
2008-2009 (computed for all 153 countries) and, second, the cumulative projected output loss 
All countries Advanced CEE Dev Asia Other EM
Pre-crisis variables
Early warnings
Current account balance -2.7 0.1 -10.4 -2.0 -2.6
Credit growth 23.2 12.9 34.9 20.4 24.3
Share prices 215.6 172.1 231.6 180.3 277.1
House prices 55.6 38.9 106.3 50.0 87.0
External debt 70.7 218.1 44.4 25.7 32.2
Inflation rate 6.2 2.4 5.8 6.7 7.5
Past GDP growth 5.4 3.8 6.5 6.5 5.6
Real exchange rate 7.1 2.7 13.9 7.6 9.1
Policy choices
Fiscal balance -0.6 0.1 -1.1 -2.2 -0.3
Real interest rate 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.8 1.2
Insurance measures
International reserves 19.0 12.5 23.1 26.2 19.1
Export concentration 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
Domestic bond market 84.3 99.2 74.9 44.5 87.0
Domestic equity market 82.4 118.4 61.5 91.8 71.2
Foreign banks 40.4 31.8 79.3 27.6 40.9 
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from Becker and Mauro (computed for the 77 countries that lost output). Figure 5 displays the 
eight early warning indicators listed in Table 1, Figure 7 the two policy choice variables, and 
Figure 8 the five insurance measures. In all the charts, the left panels show the correlation with 
the first output measure (for 153 countries) while the right panels display the correlation with 
the loss measure (for 77 countries). 
 
The first early warning indicator in Figure 5 is the average current account balance 2004-2007. It 
shows  a  modestly  positively  correlation  with  cumulated  output  changes  in  2008-2009  (left 
panel), and a much stronger correlation with the subset of countries suffering output losses in 
the crisis (right panel). The disparity between the performance of CEE and developing Asian 
countries (DA) is conspicuous, but of secondary importance for appraising predictive power.
14 
 
The credit growth indicator shows a very weak positive correlation with output performance for 
the full sample (Figure 5, left panel). This makes it a poor early warning indicator of cumulative 
GDP change 2008-09. The right panel of Figure 5 however reveals that it is an excellent early 
warning indicator for countries that experienced output losses during the crisis. The correlation 
here is strongly negative; that is, the likelihood of GDP losses during crises is highly correlated 
with easy credit. The credit growth indicator thus is unhelpful in identifying which countries will 
suffer GDP losses, but alerts policy makers to the risk that some countries are vulnerable. CEE 
countries again are overrepresented among countries falling beneath the regression line, while 
Asian countries perform better. 
 
Asset price increases (or “asset bubbles”) are widely considered harbingers of busts and crises. 
Two early warning  indicators of this type are  reported in Table 1: equity share prices, and 
housing prices. Figure 5 reveals that asset price inflation was a mixed predictor of the 2008-09 
crisis. Stock prices are positively correlated with cumulative GDP using the full set of countries 
(Figure 5, left panel), but shows a weak negative correlation with output performance for those 
that actually experienced losses (Figure 5, right panel).  However, there is a strong negative 
correlation between house prices and cumulative GDP for both populations (Figure 5, left and 
right panels), which makes them good predictors. The regional differences again are evident, 
with developing Asia consistently above the regression line, and CEE countries (and advanced 
countries in the full sample) below.  
 
   
                                                        
14 We will later investigate whether other economic variables explain this regional pattern.  
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External debt also proves to be an accurate predictor, just as it was previously when applied 
exclusively  to  emerging  market  countries.  It  is  negatively  correlated  with  cumulative  GDP 
change in both the full sample and sample of countries losing GDP 2008-09 (Figure 5, left and 
right  panels).  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  it  is  the  advance  countries  that  drive  the 
correlations. In separate plots of emerging markets and regional country groups (not shown 
here) there are actually slight positive correlations between external debt and GDP growth.  
 
Inflation also is a mixed predictor. It is positively correlated with cumulative GDP change, and 
negatively correlated with the same metric for countries that lost GDP 2008-09 (Figure 5, left 
and right panels). Regional differences are evident as before with other indicators. CEE countries 
fall below the regression line, and Asian countries above it. 
  
Past GDP growth shows a positive correlation with cumulative output for the full sample of 
countries in 2008-09 and a negative correlation for countries that swooned into depression 
(Figure 5, left and right panel). As before, this mixed result tells us that the past GDP growth 
early warning indicator can serve only as a cautionary signal, not as a dependable predictor. 
 
The final early warning indicator plotted is the change in the real exchange rate prior to the 
crisis. Again we have a mixed predictor that shows a positive correlation with output in 2008-
2009  for  all  countries  (Figure  5,  left  panel),  meaning  that  countries  with  appreciating  real 
exchange rates prior to the crisis did relatively well during 2008-2009. However, for countries 
that lost output in the crisis, the correlation is negative (Figure 5, right panel), implying that 




3.2.2. Policy choices 
 
Policy  choice  variables  provide  insight  into  macro-regulatory  intentions  of  national 
governments. The two predictors listed in Table 1 are fiscal balances and real interest rates and 
the corresponding plots with output performance are shown in Figure 7 below. Fiscal deficits in 
Keynesian theory are thought to be stimulatory; surpluses either stabilizing or contractive. High 
real interest rates ceteris paribus are believed to be GDP growth retarding; low real interest 
rates expansionary. However, policy makers (in most cases) only seek to set a nominal policy 
interest rate, and the real interest rate is then a result of this rate and the realized inflation rate. 
Realized inflation is in turn a complex equilibrium macro outcome that does not only depend on 
the nominal policy rate but also on external and domestic balances that are linked to exchange 
rates and fiscal policy. Policy makers’ intentions therefore can be deduced from the handling of 
fiscal balances and real interest rates, providing clues about the likelihood of ensuing crises. This 




15 The correlations reported later must be interpreted in this broad context. 
 
Here the focus is not on contemporaneous correlations between policy variables and economic 
outcomes but  on how past policies affected crisis outcomes. Past fiscal policy can then  be 
viewed as an indicator of policy makers ability to control fiscal spending in good times (since 
2004-2007 where generally boom years), or as possibly contributing to domestic instability by 
building up balance sheet vulnerabilities in the public sector. In short, the question is: did past 
fiscal prudence pay off in terms of better economic performance in the crisis? Similar with past 
real  interest  rates;  did  cheap  credit  in  the  pre-crisis  boom  fuel  unsustainable  asset  price 
increases or balance sheet vulnerabilities in the private sector that later had a negative effect on 
output in the crisis? 
 
 





Note: The two bars to the left show cumulative growth in 2008 and 2009 for the full sample of countries 
distinguishing between countries with fixed and floating exchange rates while the two bars to the right show 
cumulative GDP for countries that lost GDP in the crisis, again distinguishing between countries with fixed versus 
floating exchange rates. Unweighted averages are shown in all bars. The classification of exchange rate regimes is 
based on de facto exchange rate regime in 2007 from Ghosh, Ostry and Tsangarides (2010). 
 
 
The exchange rate regimes in force in the countries included in the full data set, and the set of 
countries that succumbed to depression 2008-09 are illustrated in Figure 6 with bar graphs 
indicating how much fixers and floaters gained or lost GDP in the crisis. The two bars on the left 
report the cumulative GDP performance in the full sample of countries, and the two bars on the 
right represent the GDP losses experienced in the crisis countries. 
 
The frequency of output loss countries is roughly the same in nations with fixed and floating 
                                                        
15 For a recent discussion of the choice of exchange rate regimes and associated costs and benefits, see Gosh, 



















rate foreign exchange regimes. Countries with fixed exchange rates however fared worse during 
the 2008-09 crisis both in terms of cumulative GDP change and the loss of GDP. For the full 
sample, countries with fixed exchange rates had two percentage points (or 25 percent) lower 
output gains on average over 2008-09, and  for the  output loss countries, those with fixed 
exchange rates suffered losses close to three percentage points (or 30 percent) greater than 
floaters.  
 
It is interesting to note however, that while floaters clearly outperformed exchange rate fixers, 
past fiscal policy was more or less neutral in its effect on cumulative GDP change (Figure 7, left 
panel).  However,  in  the  sample  of  countries  that  lost  GDP  in  the  crisis,  pre-crisis  fiscally 
conservative economies outperformed liberal spenders (right panel). Again, some of the glaring 
negative outliers are in the CEE region (and the private sector borrowing in the Baltic countries 
was particularly extreme).  
 
 















Macro-theorists consider the real interest rate a key barometer of domestic imbalances.
16 Very 
high rates can signal significant risk premia, and very low or even negative rates can be signs of 
slack investment demand. Cheap money has been a driving force in many financial crises and 
speculative asset price increases. The correlations between  cumulative GDP change and the 
past real interest rate for both data pools are positive (Figure 7). Low real interest rates go hand 
in hand with poor GDP performance in both  cases; consistent with the hypothesis that cheap 
credit creates vulnerabilities that lead to poor economic performance down the road.  
 
Again, the interpretation regarding the real interest rate as a policy variable or macro outcome 
is far  from clear, but still  it seems that on average, very low real interest rates have been 
correlated with poor performance in this crisis. If today’s low nominal policy rates also translate 
into low real interest rates (which is not always and everywhere true), this may not be all good 
news for financial stability and output growth in the future. 
 
3.2.3. Country Insurance 
 
Deterioration  in  national  crisis  prevention  safeguard  systems  provides  a  third  set  of  crisis 
predictors.  These  country  insurance  indicators  include  international  reserves;  export 
concentration; size of the domestic capital market; and the share of foreign banks. Each variable 
represents a different vulnerability. Low reserves invite sudden stops in capital inflows or capital 
flight. Concentrated exports render nations vulnerable to shifts in terms of trade. Undeveloped 
domestic capital markets may indicate overreliance on foreign funding, while the absence of 
foreign competition in the banking systems could be a sign of an inefficient banking system. The 
different insurance indicators are plotted against output performance in Figure 8. 
 
International reserves can be accumulated for different reasons, including support for an export 
oriented growth strategy. However, it can also be viewed as buying insurance against sudden 
stoppages in capital inflows, which clearly has been a motive in some countries, not least in Asia 
where countries witnessed the effects of sharp capital flow reversals in the 1997 crisis. In the 
2008-09 crisis holding larger international reserves has been positively correlated with better 
economic performance, both in the full sample and among the output loss countries (Figure 8, 
left and right panels). The real side of the foreign reserves phenomenon is changes in current 
account  balances  and  separate  plots  (not  shown  here)  indicated  that  there  is  a  strong 
correlation  between  swings  in  current  accounts  and  output  performance,  both  in  the  full 
sample and more strongly among the output loss countries.
17  
                                                        
16 The real interest rate in micro theory is determined by “time preference” and under competition represents the 
inter-temporal equilibrium price of trading with the future. High and low interest rates affect the composition of 
GDP, but not its level. See Irving Fisher, The Theory of Interest, 1930. 
17  These  correlations  include  all  changes  in  current  accounts.  However,  if  we  filter  the  samples,  limiting  our 
attention to the countries experiencing sudden capital inflow stoppages (cases where pre-crisis current account 






























Diversified exports are generally viewed as insurance against shocks, which is relevant in many 
cases where particular sectors or commodities are sequentially hit by price shocks, one at a 
time.  Export  concentration  in  this  crisis  has  a  slightly  positive  correlation  with  economic 
performance in both samples indicating that diversification of exports did not help countries 
this time (Figure 8, left and right panels). One explanation is that most sectors and commodities 
experienced a contraction in the crisis, and exporting different goods only help when shocks hit 
one sector at the time. This does not mean that countries should ignore the potential value of 
having diversified exports because this crisis is unusual compared to past episodes (and most 
likely in the future) when terms-of-trade shocks were more narrowly concentrated. 
 
Diversification has not only been promoted on the real side of the economy, but also in finance. 











financial flows, and are construed here in this sense.
18 However, the indicator may be blurred to 
the extent that foreign investors account for a large share of a domestic market , or domestic 
investors behave like foreign investors in countries with relatively open capital accounts.  If 
investors in local markets hedge currency risks and move capital in and out of a country’s 
domestic markets, a country with a large domestic market is also subject to risks of large capital 
flow reversals that affect exchange rates and funding opportunities in crisis times.  In this crisis, 
the  correlations  between  the  size  of  domestic  bond  and  equity  markets  and  economic 
performance were slightly negative or non-existent, excluding some outliers (Figure 8, left and 
right panels).  
 
This should not deter efforts to develop domestic capital markets in countries that are lacking 
them  because  such  development  may  have  positive  effects  on  various  institutional  factors 
important for long-run growth. However, in this crisis, domestic capital markets did not seem to 
improve economic performance. Given the negative role the financial sector has played in many 
countries in the 2008 crisis, this may not be too surprising. The lesson for a country that wants 
to develop its capital markets to enhance future growth prospects is that it is a good idea to 
think hard about regulation and supervision of these markets from the outset. 
 
Banks are another important part of the financial system and in many developing countries and 
emerging markets, the participation of foreign banks has been seen as a way to modernize and 
enhance domestic banking efficiency and stability. There is probably little doubt that foreign 
banks bring new skills and technologies to domestic banking markets, but the question here is 
whether this contributed to better output performance in the 2008-09 crisis. The correlation 
between the share of foreign banks in the domestic banking system and output performance is 
slightly negative in the full sample (Figure 8, left panel), and more strongly so among output loss 
countries (Figure 8, right panel).  
 
The share of foreign banks also is strongly correlated with current account balances. A larger 
share  of  foreign  banks  is  associated  with  larger  pre-crisis  current  account  deficits.  Current 
account  deficits  in  turn  have  been  shown  above  to  be  associated  with  inferior  economic 
performance in this crisis, especially among output loss countries. If foreign banks provide easy 
access to foreign credit that allows unsustainable current account deficits, this may create a 
vulnerability that outweighs the benefits of a more efficient domestic banking system. 
 
3.2.4. Summary of indicators and output performance 
 
The visual patterns in Figures 5, 7 and 8 are complemented with Table 2, which summarizes the 
numerical correlation estimates and their statisical significance. The data in Table 2 reveal that 
although correlations are informative, only a handful are statistically significant and there are 
                                                        
18 This characterization assumes that domestic capital markets provide services that international markets 
do not, such as, allowing domestic entities to fund themselves with local currency instruments or by 
pulling in domestic savings into the financial systems that otherwise are used inefficiently.  
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potential discrepancies in magnitudes and even the signs between the full sample and the 
output  loss  countries.  There  is  only  one  variable,  house  prices,  that  displays  a  statistically 
significant correlation with the same (negative) sign  in both samples. For two of the most 
discussed variables in the aftermath of the crisis, current account balances and credit growth, 
there is a very small and insignificant correlation in the full sample, but a statistically significant 
correlation with the expected sign in the output loss sample.  
 
 
Table 2. Summary of correlations between variables and output performance 
 
 
Note: The first column corresponds to the scatter plots of all countries in the left hand panels of Figures 5, 7 and 8 




Several of the variables in the Table 2 are correlated with each other as well as with economic 
performance. The distortion could be addressed by  including them all in a  regression with 
economic performance as the dependent variable, but as mentioned in the introduction, this 
has not been done due to data limitation. There are too few degrees of freedom. Nevertheless, 
some cross-correlations among the variables are worth mentioning to give a fuller picture of 
their covariances prior to the crisis. First, credit growth as expected was positively correlated 
with several variables: asset prices, GDP growth, inflation and the real foreign exchange rate. 
More surprisingly, it was only significantly correlated with current account balances in advanced 
countries. This is unexpected given the strong correlation between the variables in previous 
emerging  market  crises  and  the  pre-crisis  development  in  the  CEE  region,  but  it  was  not 
something  observable  in  other  emerging  markets  in  this  crisis.  Current  account  balances 
GDP 2008-09 Output loss
Pre-crisis variables
Macro outcomes
Current account balance 0.0494 0.2574*
Credit growth 0.031 -0.3682*
Share prices 0.2757 -0.0281
House prices -0.3207* -0.6411*
External debt -0.3958* -0.1416
Inflation rate 0.1854* -0.0554
Past GDP growth 0.3275* -0.3318*
Real exchange rate 0.1592 -0.4045*
Policy choices
Real interest rate 0.1365 0.4800*
Fiscal balance 0.0309 0.1208
Insurance measures
International reserves 0.2599* 0.1352
Export concentration 0.1015 0.122
Domestic bond market -0.1313 -0.1431
Domestic equity market -0.1193 0.0688




showed  a  significant  negative  correlation  with  house  price  increases  in  emerging  market 
economies partly because the sample for which we have house prices is incomplete, and over-
represents the CEE region. Current account balances also have been positively correlated with 
fiscal balances and with the share of foreign banks in the domestic banking system both in 
emerging markets and advanced countries.   
 
4. Crisis management strategies 
 
When crisis prevention fails, crisis management has to step in to minimize the damage. Given 
that many crisis countries haven’t fully recovered, and the full experience is not observable, it is 
premature  to  make  a  conclusive  assessment  about  the  comparative  merit  of  various  crisis 
predictors, and intervention strategies. This section therefore is descriptive. Before turning to 
the quantitative matters, we provide a brief discussion of the lessons discernible  from past 
crises.  
 
4.1 Lessons from the past 
 
The key lesson from the past used at the onset of the 2008-09 crisis came from the widely held 
view  that  the  severity  of  the  great  depression  was  attributable  to  governments’  failure  to 
employ its full kit of policy tools. This lesson pertained exclusively to serious crisis situations; 
not  “business  as  usual”  monetary  and  fiscal  policy,  which  over  the  years  had  increasingly 
become rules based and intervention averse.  
 
Accordingly, when Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy threatened to devastate the global financial 
system  in  September  2008,  contemporary  macroeconomic  theorists  counseled  energetic 
counter-crisis fiscal and monetary intervention, including bailouts for  banks and other large 
financial institutions. This  posture was mirrored by  the IMF’s advice and the design of the 
economic  rescue  packages  organized  by  the  international  community.  Suddenly,  Keynesian 
policy was rehabilitated after having fallen from grace in the late 1990s.
19  
 
Many of these Keynesian prescriptions departed sharply from prior IMF policies recommended 
during and after the emerging market crises of the 1980’s and 90’s. These crisis management 
strategies stressed adjusting exchange rates to restore competitiveness and confidence, backed 
up with stringent fiscal and monetary policies aimed at preventing sovereign defaults, hyper 
inflation and free falling exchange rates. Unlike the “Washington consensus” applied during the 
Asian  crisis  in  the  late  1990s,  it  focused  almost  exclusively  on  macroeconomic  factors, 
disregarding  structural  reforms  presumably  because  market  liberalization,  subsidy  reduction 
and privatization were regarded as subsidiary issues for advanced western economies.  
                                                        
19 See chapter 2, this volume. The insurgent “Ricardian Equivalence,” “Great Moderation,” and “Divine 
Coincidence” doctrines persuaded most macro-theorists that fiscal policy was ineffectual.  
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4.2 Domestic responses 
 
Endogeneity clouds the cause and effects of the new crisis intervention strategy, and compels us 
to describe more than explain its effects in different parts of the world. As was discussed above, 
it is too early to tell what policy responses will be able to generate not only short-run relief, but 
also longer-term sustainable growth in incomes and welfare.  
 
The policy variables scrutinized are fiscal balances, monetary policy in the form of policy interest 
rates, market rates, inflation and real interest rates, and exchange rate changes versus both the 
dollar  and  the  euro  (See  Table  3).  Four  outcome  variables  are  included,  current  account 
balances, credit growth and average GDP growth in 2008-09 and projected for 2010-12. To 
facilitate the comparison with pre-crisis policies, we also report changes in the key variables 
from the pre-crisis benchmark. 
 
 
Table 3. Key domestic policy variables and macro outcomes 
 
Note: Country group medians for 2008-2009, changes compared to 2004-2007. 
 
 
The first thing to note is that fiscal deficits, driven mostly by Keynesian policy considerations, 
have widened across the globe. Advanced countries and the CEE region have seen the largest 
deterioration in their fiscal balances, 2½ and over 3 percentage points respectively. Countries in 
developing Asia entered the crisis with larger deficits and have only added half a percentage 
point to them in the crisis.
20 In a number of CEE co untries, the fiscal position  deteriorated 
significantly despite substantial spending cuts.  
                                                        
20 The deficits reported in Table 6.3 are real outcome rather than targets or estimates, and therefore serve only as 
oblique indicators of policy makers’ choice. No attempt is made here to devise more sophisticated measures of 
fiscal policy because the assumptions required are too heroic with regard to future growth rates and potential GDP, 
etc.  
 
All countries Advanced CEE Dev Asia Other EM No-loss EM Loss EM
Fiscal balance -2.6 -3.2 -4.0 -2.6 -2.3 -2.2 -3.0
change  -1.5 -2.5 -3.2 -0.6 -1.0 -0.5 -2.8
Policy interest rate 6.6 1.6 6.1 6.3 8.8 7.7 8.5
Market interest rate 3.5 0.8 5.9 5.1 5.0 4.3 7.6
change -1.4 -3.5 0.9 -0.7 -0.2 -0.8 2.4
Inflation 5.0 1.7 4.4 8.2 6.6 6.7 5.7
change 0.0 -0.6 -1.3 2.0 0.0 0.5 -1.5
Real interest rate 0.5 0.5 0.9 -0.4 0.8 0.8 0.3
change -0.6 -0.7 -0.3 -1.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2
Exchange rate change v. USD 2.6 6.4 -1.4 4.1 1.4 2.1 2.6
Exchange rate change v. euro 4.1 8.0 0.0 5.6 2.9 3.6 4.1
Current account -4.3 -1.3 -7.7 -3.2 -5.5 -5.2 -5.6
change  -1.4 -1.9 2.5 -1.9 -2.6 -3.0 -0.4
Credit growth  17.2 7.0 22.9 18.2 17.9 19.0 15.8
change  -2.4 -3.9 -14.8 -1.4 -3.1 -0.6 -7.6
Avg. GDP growth 2008-09 1.9 -1.0 0.3 4.5 3.3 4.7 0.3
Avg. proj. GDP growth 2010-12 4.1 2.1 2.8 5.6 4.6 5.3 3.3 
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Keynesian  monetary  policy  likewise  has  been  expansionary.  Advanced  countries  have  been 
cutting  policy  interest  rates  very  aggressively,  and  market  interest  rates  have  fallen  by  3½ 
percentage points, without seriously affecting wage and price levels. Inflation as measured by 
official statistics has declined and is on average less than two percent. In some countries, it is 
close to zero.
21 Policy interest rates and inflation in emerging markets prior to the crisis were 
substantially  higher  than  in  advanced  countries.  Inflation  remained  higher,  and  actually  
increased in developing Asia during the 2008-09 crisis, but this was atypical. The crisis triggered 
a sharp drop in prices in the CEE region. CEE market interest rates, however, moved in the 
opposite direction as lenders demanded premia to compensate for increased credit risk.  
 
Exchange  rate  policy  responses  to  the  2008-09  crisis  differed  widely  despite  a  Keynesian 
inclination toward devaluation because many nations have fixed foreign exchange rate regimes. 
Nonetheless, many countries with floating, or flexible peg exchange rate regimes fostered the 
depreciation of their currencies including America and the EU. Others sought to stimulate their 
economies even more by depreciating their currencies against the “safe” dollar and euro. The 
only exception is the CEE region where many countries had fixed their currencies to the euro. 
When other countries around the world let their currencies fall, this put additional pressure on 
the CEE region. Part of the region’s poor economic performance surely is due to this rigidity.  
 
Finally, policy makers tried to shore up their beleaguered economies with massive support to 
financial  sectors,  ranging  from  direct  balance  sheet  assistance,  to  large-scale  guarantees. 
Liquidity  problems  in  banks  and  financial  institutions  during  the  2008-09  crisis  made 
government financial assistance essential in 16 advanced countries, 3 in the CEE region, and 4 in 
CIS countries. The direct fiscal costs, according to Leaven and Valencia (2010) are around 5 
percent of GDP, while the impact on public debt averages almost 25 percent of GDP. 
 
4.3 International community’s response 
 
The years before the 2008-09 crisis were relatively stable, especially in major emerging market 
countries receiving large international funding packages from the IMF and other IFIs. As a result, 
IMF lending declined substantially (Figure 9), and policy makers around the globe convinced 
themselves that the planet had entered a new, crisis-free age, dubbed the “Great Moderation.”  
 
The signs of this new confidence were visible in many places, not least in the board of the IMF 
where shareholder governments made two decisions that in retrospect look particularly unwise. 
First, staff at the IMF was cut significantly barely a year prior to the crisis; and, second, it was 
decided not to push forward with a new crisis-prevention facility designed to deter capital flight 
in international capital markets.
22 The decision to cut IMF staff was clearly linked to the funding 
model of the IMF, which predicted lower revenues due to  reduced crisis borrowing by large 
                                                        
21 Some are critical of the official measures of inflation but a full discussion of the extent to which official statistics 
provide a measure of prices that are relevant to a majority of consumers is beyond the scope of this chapter. 








Figure 9. IMF credit outstanding 
 
 
Note: PRGT lending by the IMF is directed to poorer countries as part of a poverty reduction and growth strategy 
while GRA lending is the IMF’s main lending to countries that are in need of balance of payments support. SDR is 
the IMF’s unit of account and SDR 100 was equivalent of around USD 150 late 2011. 
 
 
Seldom have policy makers been more wrong. The pre-crisis thinking could best be described as 
lessons unlearned and a widespread “This time is different” mentality. Many economists have 
used the phrase in the aftermath of the crisis to describe the build-up to the crisis. It is also the 
title  of  the  2009  book  by  Reinhart  and  Rogoff,  which  has  the  subtitle  “Eight  centuries  of 
financial folly”.   
 
Once the crisis hit, it became apparent that the “Great Moderation” had been wishful thinking; 
that  there  was  an  enduring  need  for  an  effective  crisis  prevention  regime,  and  that  many 
countries couldn’t cope with external shocks without international assistance.  
 
A  coordinated  international  policy  response  was  needed  and  the  IMF  was  the  only  viable 
institution for providing it. The G-20 was of course the international political gathering that was 
setting the course for this work, but it was the IMF that had the infrastructure and competence 
to deal with large-scale and timely lending programs to countries with balance of payments 
                                                        
23 The reason it was hard to convince shareholder governments to increase IMF funding that did not rely on its 
lending operations was that many questioned the mandate of the IMF altogether in the years prior to the crisis. 
With capital markets so large and efficient and countries having learnt the lessons from previous crises, an 









































































































































































problem. Even the EU and the Eurozone eventually realized that IMF involvement was essential 
in euro countries. 
 
IMF resources accordingly have been increased. The Fund’s lending capacity grew in several 
steps from around $250bn to $750bn after negotiations in various G-20 meetings. It was also 
agreed that international liquidity should be increased by providing central banks with extra 
foreign exchange reserves.  SDR allocations were increased by $250bn for this purpose. Part of 
the international bargain has been to increase the voice of emerging markets on the IMF board. 
Suddenly, countries that had been viewed as potential IMF borrowers have become funders of 
the international bailouts, changing the power balance.
24  
 
The  idea  of  crisis-prevention  lending  facilities  for  countries  with  good  policy  records  pre-
qualifying for large credit lines was finally accepted during the crisis. The reform came too late 
for the countries already stricken, but is still a valuable tool for averting future contagion. Late 
2011,  three  countries  had  access  to  SDR70bn  of  such  funding,  which  can  be  compared  to 
around SDR90bn in outstanding credit and SDR250bn of forward commitment capacity.  
 
Presumably, had global policy makers been less enthralled with the “Great Moderation,” their 
response would have been more effective, but the cost of this wishful thinking is difficult to 
calibrate because when the crisis struck, authorities reacted decisively. 
 
IMF papers and presentations document that policy makers responded to the 2008 crisis with 
unusually large international rescue packages and less stringent conditionality.
25 The EU and the 
ECB  intervened  with  more  or  less  ( in)transparent  bailouts  to  EU  countries ,  first  outside 
(Hungary,  Latvia  and  Romania) ,  and  then  inside  (Greece  and  Ireland)  the  Eurozone .  The 
European Stabilisation Mechanism was set up in May 2010 with several pillars including ECB and 
IMF funding of up to €750 bn. Already the packages to the countries listed above amount to 
around €100bn. At the same time, the ECB provided €500bn in loans to commercial banks in 
Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain in early 2011.  
 
In sum, the financial response of the international community to crisis stricken countries has 
been substantial.  Nevertheless, the constant political battles over how much, when and to 
whom, and taking a piecemeal approach to arranging various bailout mechanisms particularly in 
Europe has created a significant amount of uncertainty that has impeded the restoration of 
confidence.  
 
                                                        
24 Discussions on reforming IMF governance began long before the crisis, but the crisis transformed talk into 
action. The process is incomplete.  Quotas and voting power still need further adjustment to accurately reflect the 
economic importance and strength of member countries. 
25 See for example IMF (2010a) and Giorgianni (2009).  
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5. Conclusions and lessons for the future 
 
The 2008 crisis has (re-)kindled a heated debate on how to avoid and manage crises as well as 
rethinking macroeconomic policies more generally.
26 Many see the 2008 crisis as a wakeup call 
that will help the world community implement much needed reform in areas ranging from 
regulation of the international financial system to reforming the voting sha res in the IFIs,  to 
setting-up robust early warning systems, and pushing through structural reforms in advanced 
countries to stimulate growth and assure sustainable fiscal dynamics. As the world economy is 
recovering, many of the more ambitious goals are taking a backseat and the attention is shifting 
to more immediate rescue efforts in countries with the direst needs. Many argue that this is a 
missed opportunity that will contribute to a new crisis in a not too distant future, and it is not 
hard to see why this may happen, given the one-way street rescues provided to financial firms 
“too-big-to-fail.” 
 
Despite the global label that is used for the crisis, there are large differences in the crisis’s 
impact among the country groups discussed above. Most notably, the central figures in this 
crisis are advanced countries, and CEE countries with strong financial and trade ties to the 
advanced economies. By contrast, developing Asia fared relatively well in the crisis, and in many 
instances suffered few ill effects. Of course, the global label is appropriate from the standpoint 
of worldwide aggregate economic activity. Planetary GDP did fall due to the high weight of crisis 
stricken  advanced  countries.  29  of  32  advanced  countries  suffered  output  losses,  in  stark 
contrast to the MENA region, where only one country experienced an output decline in 2008-
2009. Likewise, growth in developing Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa was mostly positive during 
the 2008 crisis. 
  
Early warning indicators did signal problems in CEE, but when we plot all countries together, 
most of these indicators were weakly or moderately correlated with economic performance, 
and served as poor crisis predictors. Some were better when the focus is narrowed to the sub-
set of crisis-afflicted countries, and may serve as effective indicators of future vulnerability. This 
suggests that a principal virtue of compiling crisis predictors is the impetus they provide for 
closer case-by-case investigation to resolve ambiguities.   
 
“False positives” add another wrinkle. In some cases a signal will be truly false in the sense that 
no crisis is coming, but in others the signal may merely be premature. For example, in Latvia, 
the IMF raised warning flags several years before the crisis, but they were ignored because the 
economy kept flourishing for another three years. The signals were correct, but timing wasn’t. 
This problem is especially perplexing for crises involving speculative bubbles. Many observers 
did not believe the dot com hype, and claimed it was a bubble well before it burst, but investors 
that listened to that advice too early lost significant amounts of money in the interim. Timing is 
also a bothersome empirical issue. It is difficult to include all relevant leads and lags when 
constructing an empirical model, especially when they are country specific.  
                                                        
26 A paper that received ample attention both among academics and policy makers is Blanchard, Dell’Arriccia and 




At the end of the day, cheap money that fuels rapid credit and funds speculative debt-financed 
asset investments turns out to be a primary cause of most “bubbles.” Once confidence falters, 
too many debtors simultaneously run into trouble, and the financially over-exposed cannot save 
themselves without government support. Some governments are able to provide the needed 
assistance, but in many cases, the international community has to come to the rescue.  
 
Most people concur with this diagnosis. However, it doesn’t save the day because interested 
parties  tend  to  disagree  about  whether  economies  are  over-stimulated.  Economists  cannot 
infallibly foretell that money is too cheap, credit is growing too fast and assets are overvalued 
before crises, leaving the door open to procrastination that assures “this time” really won’t be 
“different.”  
 
However, persistent crises cannot be ascribed solely to stochastic ambiguity. It also is the result 
of  a  fundamental  mismatch  between  speculators’  expected  returns  (including  anticipated 
bailouts), and social costs. If the well-paid financial players had to pick up the bill after each 
financial  meltdown,  they  would  be  much  more  risk-averse,  and  welfare  losses  would  be 
correspondingly lower. Policy makers are in a position to redress this asymmetry, but have been 
noticeably loath to do so, suggesting that when push comes to shove they don’t place enough 
importance on crisis prevention. 
 
The 2008 crisis has also made it clear that the link between fiscal deficits and national debt 
must  be  confronted.  Deficit  spending  one’s  way  out  of  recession  without  accumulating 
countercyclical  surpluses  is  a  temporary  palliative  setting  the  stage  for  even  greater  crises 
tomorrow. Several countries have seen their public debt explode in the 2008-09 crisis, both 
because of the direct bailout costs borne by the public sector, and the crisis’s impact on the tax 
base and government transfers. Economists at the IMF and elsewhere have rightly called for 
creating fiscal space in good times to finance counter-crisis deficit spending later.  
 
Becker (1999) has suggested that public debt management strategies should include the risks of 
bailouts, which would affect both desired debt levels and the composition of public debt. In the 
model, the public debt manager should basically undo (part) of the private sectors financial 
decisions  by  taking  the  opposite  position  in  the  public  debt  portfolio.  This  is  Ricardian 
equivalence in reverse. The standard Ricardian argument as in Barro (1974) is that households 
undo  the  government  deficit  by  adjusting  its  savings,  which  leads  to  the  neutrality  of 
government debt. 
 
In the final analysis, the lesson from our investigation is simply that crises will always be too 
frequent and severe because of human folly, and governments should be prepared to deal with 
them  in  a  manner  that  reduces  the  negative  income  and  welfare  effects  for  the  whole 
population. This requires major changes to financial sector regulation, reducing moral hazard in 
lending and borrowing, limiting bailouts, and making significant changes to fiscal policy and 
public debt management. It also necessitates the creation of crisis prevention regimes, despite 
their  limitations,  that  press  policy  makers  to  take  better  account  of  catastrophic  risk,  and  
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encourage them to prioritize stability over wishful thinking. Our scatterplots have shown that 
early warning indicators can provide useful signals of mounting risk for the global community, 
even though they don’t always apply to the entire population of countries. Very little of this will 
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Table A.1. Countries economic performance in the crisis 
 
 
Note: The three columns are crisis loss, computed as in Becker and Mauro for output loss periods starting in either 
2008 or 2009, duration is the time in years to get back to pre-crisis GDP levels, and the GDP0809 column is the 





Countries Crisis loss duration GDP0809 Countries Crisis loss duration GDP0809 Countries Crisis loss duration GDP0809
Advanced economies Developing Asia MENA
Ireland -20.0 8 -14.4 Samoa -11.2 5 4.8 UAE -4.8 3 7.7
Iceland -16.9 6 -4.9 Fiji -4.1 4 -2.5 Sudan 18.5
Greece -16.6 12 2.0 Kiribati -3.3 4 -2.9 Jordan 17.7
Finland -13.9 6 -6.2 Thailand -2.2 2 2.6 Egypt 19.4
Slovenia -13.6 5 -1.1 Solomon Islands -2.2 2 12.2 Tunisia 12.3
Japan -12.4 6 -7.6 Cambodia -2.0 2 11.3 Oman 29.7
Italy -12.2 8 -7.6 Malaysia -1.7 2 7.6 Lebanon 28.4
Sweden -9.7 4 -5.9 Tonga -0.5 2 1.1 I.R. Iran 3.1
Denmark -9.6 5 -6.4 Pakistan 6.7 Syrian Arab Rep. 14.5
Slovak Republic -8.6 3 7.4 Philippines 8.5 Rep. of Yemen 11.3
United Kingdom -8.5 5 -5.0 Myanmar 12.3 Bahrain 15.9
Czech Republic -8.2 4 0.7 Sri Lanka 15.7 Morocco 16.4
Germany -7.9 3 -2.8 Vanuatu 16.5 Djibouti 17.0
Netherlands -7.3 4 -0.2 Bhutan 16.6
Austria -7.0 4 0.4 Indonesia 16.8 SSA
Luxembourg -7.0 3 -4.0 Nepal 17.4 Eritrea -17.4 5 -16.3
Spain -6.5 5 -2.0 Bangladesh 17.9 Madagascar -8.2 4 10.3
United States -5.2 3 -2.6 Papua New Guinea 18.1 Botswana -3.7 2 2.5
Portugal -4.9 7 -2.7 Vietnam 18.3 Seychelles -1.9 3 -1.8
Belgium -4.2 3 -1.1 India 18.8 South Africa -1.8 2 5.5
France -4.1 3 -2.4 Lao P.D.R. 23.8 Gabon -1.4 2 3.9
Malta -3.7 3 3.0 China 29.2 Niger -1.2 2 16.1
Hong Kong SAR -2.8 2 1.5 Namibia -0.8 2 7.7
Canada -2.5 2 -1.4 LAC Guinea -0.3 2 9.6
Cyprus -2.1 3 5.4 Mexico -11.2 3 -3.7 Benin 12.7
Norway -2.0 3 0.1 The Bahamas -10.2 6 -7.6 Rep. of Congo 19.0
Switzerland -1.9 2 1.8 Venezuela -9.0 8 6.1 Togo 7.6
Taiwan P.o.C. -1.9 2 -0.5 Jamaica -7.7 6 -4.8 Burundi 12.7
New Zealand -1.7 3 -1.9 El Salvador -6.9 4 1.2 Comoros 3.8
Korea 4.8 Paraguay -3.8 2 7.6 Tanzania 21.3
Australia 5.8 Honduras -1.9 2 6.0 Cameroon 7.8
Israel 9.3 Chile -1.5 2 5.9 Kenya 5.1
Nicaragua -1.5 2 4.0 Mali 14.6
Central and Eastern Europe Costa Rica -1.1 2 4.5 Malawi 25.8
Latvia -42.1 11 -25.7 Barbados -0.5 6 -5.8 Lesotho 9.8
Estonia -34.8 9 -23.3 Brazil -0.2 2 10.1 Cote d'Ivoire 8.5
Lithuania -28.1 8 -9.7 Suriname 14.7 Zambia 18.0
Romania -14.4 5 7.0 Ecuador 13.4 Senegal 8.8
Hungary -11.7 5 -5.1 Panama 23.5 D.R. Congo 15.3
Montenegro -11.6 4 7.7 Uruguay 20.2 Ghana 18.9
Croatia -10.7 6 -1.2 Belize 7.5 Cape Verde 14.4
Bulgaria -6.9 4 6.7 Dominican Rep. 14.1 Uganda 25.2
Turkey -4.7 2 -3.4 Bolivia 15.9 Burkina Faso 13.8
Serbia -4.5 3 7.9 Colombia 6.3 Rwanda 27.0
Bos. and Herz. -3.6 3 8.1 Guatemala 7.1 C. African Rep. 5.7
F.Y.R. Macedonia -0.8 3 9.2 Guyana 7.0 Swaziland 6.0
Poland 11.8 Haiti 4.6 Mozambique 20.2
Albania 18.9 Argentina 14.4 Ethiopia 33.4
Peru 20.6 The Gambia 18.5
CI S Mauritius 12.7
Ukraine -26.7 5 -11.2 Guinea-Bissau 10.3
Armenia -25.7 5 -1.2
Russia -15.7 4 2.2
Moldova -12.9 4 8.6
Georgia -3.9 2 0.6








Table A.2. Advanced countries by economic performance and exchange rate regime 
 
 




Table A.3. Emerging market countries by economic performance and exchange rate regime 
 
 
Note: “Top 50%” refers to the best performing countries in terms of cumulative GDP change 2008-09 compared 
with 2007, “No-Loss” refers to the countries that did not experience negative growth in neither 2008 nor 2009.  